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The criminal process, my first thesis goes, is about truth. If
one agrees with that premise, the question of how to determine the
"true" facts in the criminal process becomes critical. I will try to
show that there are different concepts of procedural truth, each
traditionally associated with a different procedural system, but that
the differences have become less pronounced, and the ways of
procedural truth-finding seem to converge worldwide. Finally, I
will focus on the issue of truth-finding without trial: How can we
make sure that a procedural outcome not based on a full trial
nevertheless is based on "true" facts?
I. The Importance of Truth
Many purposes have been ascribed to the criminal process. In
Continental legal thinking, the criminal process is said to be
geared, alternatively or cumulatively, to enforcing the criminal
law, creating the basis for a just and fair judgment, restoring social
peace, or simply "finding the truth" about a criminal incident.'
t Professor of Criminal Law, University of Cologne, Germany. The author wishes to
thank Ms. Sarah Erne for her valuable research assistance.
I For a recent overview of German theories, see Peter Rie8, Ober die Aufgaben
des Strafverfahrens, 2006 JURISTISCHE RuNDscHAu 269, 270-71 (2006). For a French
viewpoint, see BERNARD BOULOC, PROCEDURE PENALE (20th ed. 2006), marginal note 3
(discussing the use of criminal procedure to ascertain the quick discovery and repression
of crime while at the same time upholding the rights of the individual).
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Anglo-American writers, by contrast, tend to emphasize the
conflict-resolving potential of the criminal process.2 None of the
potential purposes of the criminal process can be reached unless
the judgment has been based on a search for the truth. To reach
any of its goals, the process must reflect an honest effort to
determine what "really" happened. The truth evidently needs to
be sought when "finding the truth" or achieving "truth and justice"
are the declared goals of the criminal process.' However, a
successful restoration of "social peace" likewise presupposes that
the relevant facts have plausibly been established; society cannot
close the file on a disturbing incident unless convincing factual
findings have been made by an agency with authority to do so.
The importance of finding the "true" facts is demonstrated by the
successful operation of Truth and Reconciliation Commissionss
and similar institutions. In order to achieve closure on traumatic
events, it seems more important to determine and make public
what actually happened than to impose criminal sanctions.
What about conflict resolution? If we conceive of the criminal
process as a conflict between the prosecutor and the defendant,
isn't the factual basis upon which the parties reach an agreement
irrelevant? At first glance, the answer should be yes. For example,
if the prosecutor and the defendant in a robbery case both think
that the defendant should receive five years in prison, it seems to
make no difference whether the defendant actually committed the
robbery, and whether he also caused the victim's death. 6
2 See John D. Jackson, Managing Uncertainty and Finality: The Function of the
Criminal Trial in Legal Inquiry, in 1 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL 121, 124-25 (Antony Duff et
al. eds., 2004); Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the
ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 243, 248 (2004).
3 Cf MARKUS LOFFELMANN, DIE NORMATIVEN GRENZEN DER
WAHRHEITSERFORSCHUNG IM STRAFVERFAHREN 101 (2008).
4 See Fairlie, supra note 2, at 258-59.
5 Janet Cherry, Historical Truth: Something to Fight For, in LOOKING BACK
REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA 134, 143 (Charles Villa-Vincenzio & Wilhelm Verwoed eds., 2000);
Martin Imbleau, Initial Truth Establishment by Transitional Bodies and the Fight
Against Denial, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND THE COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 159, 161 (William A. Schabas & Shane
Darcy eds., 2005); James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of
Truth Commissions, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 124 (2009).
6 See Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining
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Nevertheless, even where the sentence rests on a perfectly
voluntary agreement between the prosecution and the defense, the
judgment may fail to resolve the underlying "conflict" if it appears
to a (well-informed) public to be incongruous with the event that
triggered the process. ' The reason for that residual fact-
contingency of a fair judgment lies in the understanding that even
where the law conceives of the criminal process as a contest
between the prosecution and the defense, the criminal process
differs from a civil suit in that the public is involved as an
invisible third party.8 Crime constitutes a breach of the public
peace because the offender's act violates a basic rule of social
behavior. ' Therefore, the suspicion that a crime has been
committed, as opposed to a mere breach of contract or civil tort,
concerns people beyond the individuals directly affected. Thus,
the conflict to be resolved by the criminal process is not just a
dispute between two private parties; instead, the public is
interested in the outcome, and the prosecutor is to represent that
interest.'0
This specific situation implies that not just any agreement will
do. No reliable empirical data exists on what exactly people
regard as the minimum requirements for a criminal judgment to be
"fair.""1 However, it seems reasonable to assume that the public
would be reluctant to accept a criminal judgment that is ostensibly
based on a lie. One example of such a situation is the so-called
Alford plea:'2 If a defendant pleads guilty to murder charges and in
System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2003).
7 See id at 1429.
8 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 652, 704-07 (1981).
9 See Gibson, supra note 5, at 140.
10 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 139.
11 See generally Gibson, supra note 5, at 126 (explaining the importance of
evenhandedness in "meeting expectations of fairness").
12 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970). Terry Alford was charged
with murder. Id. Due to State law applicable at the time, Alford could be sentenced to
death only if he chose a jury trial. Id. On the advice of his lawyer, Alford pleaded guilty
to murder but at the same time declared: "I pleaded guilty on second degree murder
because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault
for the other man ... I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me
for it, and that is all." Id. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court found Alford's guilty
plea to be valid. Id. See Jenny McEwan, Ritual, Fairness and Truth: The Adversarial
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the same breath declares in open court "I didn't do it," the ensuing
finding of guilt may or may not be technically valid.'3  But the
equivocality of the defendant's declarations and the apparent lack
of a reliable foundation for the court's judgment makes us (and
that means lawyers as well as the non-lawyer public) feel that the
process has not provided a proper resolution to the conflict that
triggered it.'4 The procedural rules on guilty pleas may permit the
court to ignore the defendant's protest that he was induced to
declare himself guilty only by the fear of the death penalty if he
went to trial, but the judgment remains deficient when there is
reason to believe that it is based on a fiction, or on an assumption
that is equally likely to be true or false.'" In essence, the social
acceptability of the judgment is at issue here. Society tolerates
(because it has to) a margin of error as to the court's findings of
fact and law, but even in common law systems, a judgment that
does not even claim to have a basis in "true facts" will not be
accepted as a just resolution of conflict and instead will appear as
an arbitrary judicialfiat.16
Before taking a closer look at the exact meaning of "truth,"
two caveats are in order with respect to the truth-orientation of the
criminal process. First, even if the establishment of the "truth"
about the relevant events is one of the goals of any criminal
process conducted by the state, this does not mean that every
and Inquisitorial Models of Criminal Trial, in 1 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 2, at I,
58 ("Truth is here subservient to defendant autonomy, or the appearance of it.").
Compare Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1412, 1412 (2003) (arguing
that Alford pleas are a clear violation of due process), with Alschuler, supra note 8
passim (defending the position that Alford pleas, but not all guilty pleas, should be
discontinued). For an analysis of Alford from a German perspective, see Andreas
Ransiek, Zur Urteilsabsprache im Strafprozess: Ein amerikanischer Fall, 2008
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 116, passim (2008).
13 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 ("An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he
is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.").
14 See McEwan, supra note 12, at 58 ("Pragmatism apparently gave way to the
need for catharsis.").
15 Alford, 400 U.S. at 168.
16 See Heike Jung, Ober die Wahrheit und ihre institutionellen Garanten, 2009
JURISTENZEITUNG 1129, 1130, 1134 (2009); Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process
About Truth?: A German Perspective, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 167 (2003). .
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participant is individually obliged to actively take part in the
search for truth. One can postulate that state officials (judges and
prosecutors) have an obligation to further, within the confines of
their respective procedural roles, the determination of "true" facts,
but the same obligation cannot be imposed on the defendant and
his lawyer. The defendant's right to remain silent as a corollary of
his freedom to conduct the defense as he thinks best trumps the
public interest in arriving at a truth-based judgment. It is a sign of
authoritarian systems that they espouse the idea that "we all want
to find the truth" and thereby deny the defendant's right to stay
aloof from the process or even to impede the truth-finding by
holding back crucial evidence. " Freedom-oriented procedural
systems, by contrast, grant the defendant the option of withholding
cooperation without adverse consequences.'
Secondly, there is consensus-even among those that
emphasize the truth-finding function of the criminal process-that
truth shall not be sought at any cost. All procedural systems
recognize overriding concerns that restrict or prevent the
admission of certain pieces of evidence even if they would be
necessary for presenting relevant facts to the court. 19 Human
dignity (guaranteeing a core sphere of privacy) and professional
secrecy are typical sources of such restrictions. Systems differ
with respect to the relative weight they afford the interest of
protecting the regularity of the process. Some procedural systems
17 See J.R. Spencer, Introduction to EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 1, 23-24
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002). Systems differ with respect to their
tolerance vis-A-vis a defendant's attempts to actively distort the facts that come before
the court. See Mirjan Damaika Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 527-99 (1973).
Although bribing or harassing witnesses, even if done by the defendant, will be
universally sanctioned as an illegal interference with the process, Anglo-American legal
systems punish the defendant for making false statements at the trial whereas other
systems tolerate such efforts as an instance of self-defense. Id. The fact that the
defendant can present his version of the facts without having to fear (additional) criminal
punishment may, put greater pressure on the defendant to testify. Id.
18 See Weigend, supra note 16, at 162 (describing the right to remain silent and the
privilege against self-incrimination in German law).
19 19See Antony Duff et al., Introduction: Towards a Normative Theory of the
Criminal Trial, in 1 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, supra note 2, at 1, 23. See also J.R. Spencer,
Evidence, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 602-20; Christopher
A. Bracey, Book Review: Truth and Legitimacy in the American Criminal Process, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 714-15 (2000); Jung, supra note 16, at 1130.
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tend to exclude illegally obtained evidence in an effort to thereby
deter illegal investigation methods,20 while others give preference
to obtaining a complete factual basis for the judgment and exclude
evidence only in egregious cases of unlawfulness and/or where the
evidence has been rendered unreliable, e.g., through the use of
force to obtain a statement from the accused or a witness.
Balancing such external interests against the overall interest in
establishing the truth is particularly sensitive when (possibly)
exonerating evidence is concerned. 2' Generally, the recognition of
limits to truth-seeking should not work to the detriment of the
suspect. If the exclusion of certain evidence removes a critical
piece from the prosecution's case, there is no sufficient basis for
conviction. To the extent that procedural systems place a burden
of proof with respect to certain issues ("defenses") on the defense,
inadmissibility rules should apply only in extraordinary
situations.22
II. Definitions of Truth and their Relation to Procedural
Models
If we can agree that the search for truth is an indispensable
element of the criminal process, it would be useful to know what
"truth" is.23 That question has occupied theologians, philosophers,
and lawyers for quite some time, and agreement has yet to emerge.
20 For the ongoing debate in the U.S. regarding the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, compare Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
111, 112 (2003) (arguing that the exclusionary rule has actually served to diminish
privacy), and Patrick Tinsley et al., In Defense ofEvidence and Against the Exclusionary
Rule: A Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REv. 63, 72-3 (2004) (arguing that the
exclusionary rules offend sound libertarian philosophy), with Yale Kamisar, In Defense
of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 126
(2003) (responding to critics of the exclusionary rule), and Timothy Lynch, In Defense of
the Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 711, 715, 730 (2000) (arguing that
the exclusionary rule is necessary to check the executive branch's power).
21 See Tinsley, supra note 20, at 68.
22 Examples of extraordinary situations could be: the defendant has obtained an
exonerating document by robbery or extortion (simple larceny should be a borderline
case); the defendant has used illegal threats to make a witness come forward and testify
(truthfully) on his behalf See generally Celia Goldwag, The Constitutionality of
Affirmative Defenses-After Patterson v. New York, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 655, 670 (1978).
23 See Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth About Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 23, 24 (2003) (discussing different definitions of "truth").
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Generally, one can distinguish between two approaches. 24
According to correspondence theory, a sentence is true if it
corresponds with reality. Truth, according to that theory, is like a
"hidden piece of gold"25 waiting to be discovered and brought to
light.26 Correspondence theory comports with popular notions of
truth, but it has to presuppose that we are able to determine and to
express through language what in fact "is." 27  The competing
consensus theories of truth dispense with the notion that "true
facts" exist a priori; truth, according to these theories, is what
reasonable people agree upon after a complete and fair discourse.28
The different approaches toward truth-finding connected with
these competing theories have a direct impact on the function and
structure of the criminal process. 29  If truth-finding connotes the
revelation (or discovery) of an objective reality, it is the result that
legitimizes the process. The judicial process is only the means to
24 For discussions regarding different approaches to finding truth, see Mirjan
Damagka, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 290-96 (1998). See also
Elisabetta Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic Differences and
the Search for the Truth, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 145, 146-47 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008); Jacqueline
Hodgson, Conceptions of the Trial in Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedure, in 2 THE
TRIAL ON TRIAL 223, 225 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 2006); Tatjana Hrnle, "Justice as
Fairness"-Ein Modell auch filr das Strafverfahren?, 35 RECHTSTHEORIE 175 passim
(2004); John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An
Evolutionary Approach, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 passim (1989); Gerson Triig and
Hans-JIrgen Kerner, Formalisierung der Wahrheitsfindung im (reformiert-)
inquisitorischen Strafverfahren? Betrachtungen unter rechtsvergleichender Perspektive,
in RECHT GESTALTEN- DEM RECHT DIENEN, FESTSCHRIFT FOR REINHARD BOTTCHER 191,
193-94 (Heinz Schoch et al. eds., 2007); William Twining, Some Scepticism about Some
Scepticisms, 11 J.L. Soc'y 137 passim (1984).
25 See Klaus Volk, Konfliktverteidigung, Konsensualverteidigung und die
Strafrechtsdogmatik, in FESTCHRIFT FOR HANS DAHS 495, 496 (Gunther Widmaier et al.
eds., 2005).
26 Trtig & Kerner, supra note 24, at 194.
27 See generally IAN DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 116-22 (3d ed. 2007)
(critically analyzing correspondence theory in the context of the criminal process).
28 See Hodgson, supra note 24, at 225 ("Within the common law tradition, legal
truth is seen as something which is contingent, existing not so much as an objective
absolute but as the most plausible or likely account, established after the elimination of
doubt."); Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function: The Search for Truth
and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 185, 188-89 (2002).
29 See Hodgson, supra note 24, at 225-26.
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discover the hidden, "objective" reality and should be organized to
optimize the chances of finding the "piece of gold." 30 If, on the
other hand, consensus theory is correct in postulating that
whatever emerges from a fair and rational discourse among the
parties can be accepted as the "truth," the content of the rules that
determine the process becomes more important than the outcome
itself, and adherence to these rules acquires paramount importance
for truth-finding.
Traditionally, correspondence theory has been regarded as
congruent with inquisitorial procedural systems, whereas the
adversarial process prevalent in common law countries has been
said to reflect consensus theory.3 2 It is true that each of these
procedural ideal types has features that fit well with one of the
theories of truth.3 3 If we content ourselves with a very superficial
sketch of the two models and disregard their complexities and
variants, then the distinctive feature of the adversarial model is the
assumption that an antagonistic presentation of competing
versions of the "truth" by each party is the optimal device for
bringing out the "real" truth. Hence, parties are given the power
as well as the responsibility for presenting evidence to prove their
respective versions of the truth, and each party is expected to
rigorously test the opponent's version through cross-
examination. 3 Although this procedural arrangement is not
30 Id.
31 See Damaika supra note 17, at 581 ("Almost imperceptibly, the emphasis shifts
here from problems of cognition to the concern that parties abide by the rules regulating
their 'battle."'). For a subtle and profound analysis of this issue, see ANTONY DUFF ET
AL., 3 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL 62 (2007).
32 See GERSON TROG, LOSUNGSKONVERGENZEN TROTZ SYSTEMDIVERGENZEN IM
DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN STRAFVERFAHREN 59-70 (2003). For an analysis
of the philosophical background of the two systems, see King, supra note 28, at 193-207.
An affirmative state interest in determining the truth also comports with the ideal type of
an "activist" state in the typology developed by Mirjan Damaika. MIRJAN DAMASKA,
THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 47-56 (1986). In a "reactive" state, the
judge would typically wait for the parties to present their cases and would decide their
dispute on the basis of what facts and legal propositions have been presented to him or
her. However, in the criminal process even the "reactive" state is engaged as a party, so
that Damaika's model does not quite fit.
33 See Mirjan Damaika, Epistemology and Legal Regulation of Proof 2 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 117, 120 (2003).
34 See id; Damaika, supra note 17, at 525; Grande, supra note 24, at 147.
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necessarily linked to the notion that "truth" is whatever emerges
from a fair process, both theories play well together. If no pre-
conceived "objective" truth exists, but different people entertain
different (interest-driven) notions of the relevant facts, then it
makes sense to have these different notions presented in court and
to base the decision on that version which, on balance, appears
more plausible to the trier of fact.
The inquisitorial system, by contrast, assumes that an
"objective" investigation by a neutral judge is the best guarantee
for bringing out the truth.3 6 In procedural systems that adhere to
the inquisitorial principle, it is thus typically the responsibility of a
judge-before trial, at trial, or both-to determine the scope of the
investigation as well as the witnesses, experts, documents and
other evidence to be presented.37 Modem inquisitorial systems
have tempered the judge's omnipotence by giving the parties, and
especially the prosecutor, the power to co-determine the scope of
the search for the truth. 38 For example, in most Continental
procedural systems, at trial the judge cannot extend the
investigation beyond the factual framework that the prosecutor has
defined in the charging document, and the defense can, in various
ways, introduce or at least suggest additional evidence, thus
broadening the factual basis of the court's eventual decision.39
Yet, these elements of party co-determination do not
fundamentally abrogate the system's affinity toward the
35 I leave aside rules on the burden of proof, including the rule that the defendant
can be convicted of a crime only if the prosecution has proved his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
36 See Grande, supra note 24, at 146-47.
37 See Damaika, supra note 33, at 120; see Hodgson, supra note 24, at 223-24;
see also Stefan Kirsch, Verteidigung in Verfahren vor dem Internationalen
Strafgerichtshoffjir das ehemalige Jugoslawien (JStGH), 2003 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 636,
638 (2003), regard this as the distinctive difference between the two types of process.
38 Damaika, supra note 33, at 120.
39 For example, in the Dutch system, the defense can request before trial that the
investigating judge interrogate certain witnesses with a view toward saving their
testimony for the trial phase. WETBOEK VAN STRAFVORDERING [Sv] [CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE] art. 226a-226s (Neth.). In Germany, both the defense and prosecution can
demand that the court hear certain witnesses in addition to those the presiding judge had
subpoenaed on his own motion. Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal
Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBI. I] VI, as amended §244 1 3.
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correspondence theory of truth.4 0 Neither in theory nor in practice
does the inquisitorial process produce "truth" through an
interaction between the prosecution and the defense, but it is the
court, albeit assisted by the parties, that conducts a methodical
search for the hidden piece of gold. Correspondence theory thus
remains the basis of the inquisitorial process even where the
recognition of defense rights has led to significant changes in the
original model.
The traditional associations of consensus theory with the
adversarial process, and of correspondence theory with the
inquisitorial model, capture indisputable affinities but do not
reflect the diversity and differentiation of attitudes toward "truth"
in various present-day legal systems. Most importantly, existing
procedural systems do not reflect the inquisitorial and the
adversarial ideal types in their pure form.41 The heritage of one of
the competing ideal types is still discernible in individual
procedural systems, but they all contain differing amounts of alloy
that may have entered the system because the purest doctrine of
adversariness and inquisition turned out to be impractical or
unfair. For example, the criminal process in the U.S. system,
which is clearly adversarial in its general orientation, is not
exclusively geared toward imposing and enforcing rules of fair
procedure. It also aims at determining what "actually happened."42
In fact, some of the landmark procedural rules of adversarial
systems can best be explained by the goal of truth-finding. The
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,4 3 with its
40 See King, supra note 28, at 193-207.
41 Id. at 201.
42 MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 74 et seq. (1997). Trilg and Kerner,
supra note 32, at 196-98, maintain that the U.S. process follows a "formalized
understanding" of the truth and aims to produce (herstellen), not discover (ermitteln) the
truth. For the reasons outlined in the text, this view does not completely capture the
essence of the U.S. criminal process. Judicial involvement in "finding the truth" may be
even more pronounced in England, where judicial activism during trial is accepted more
readily than in the U.S. Cf JOHN SPRACK, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 353-54 (10th ed. 2004). In common law systems, the reluctance ofjudges to
meddle with the party presentation of evidence may have more to do with the presence
ofjuries than with a desire to uphold adversariness in its pure form.
43 Cf 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 27 (2d ed. 1923) (Cross-examination
"is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.").
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corollary of excluding hearsay evidence, is to make certain that
testimony is not accepted by the trier of fact without thoroughly
testing its accuracy and reliability." One of the rationales of the
privilege against self-incrimination is that allowing compulsion
against the suspect is likely to produce false confessions. 4
Another example is the rule that disallows the introduction of
overly "inflammatory" evidence that might appeal too strongly to
the emotions of the trier of fact and thus prevent him from
rationally assessing its probative value.46 Given these instances of
truth-orientation of evidence law, it would be at least an
overstatement to claim that adversarial systems are not interested
in "substantive" truth.47 The rules of these systems are, on the
contrary, designed to get at the "true" facts of the case.4 8
The same ambivalence appears when we look at inquisitorial
systems such as France or Germany. American readers may be
surprised to note that the very first article of the French Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that the criminal process must be fair
and adversarial and must safeguard the equilibrium between the
parties' rights. 4 Even though the French understanding of
adversariness ("contradictoire") may be more limited and
formalized than in the Anglo-American world, denoting the
parties' right to be heard on equal terms,o the French Code's clear
acceptance of the parties' active role is a far cry from the clich6 of
inquisitorial procedure. In fact, limitations and conditions hedging
the search for "truth" are far from infrequent in inquisitorial
44 JOHN R. SPENCER, HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 9-13 (2008).
See also the critical account in PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 215-21 (2004).
45 In some common law systems, the test for excluding confessions
characteristically is the reliability of the statement, not the method by which it has been
obtained. See, e.g., Police and Criminal Evidence Act, Current Law Statutes [C.L.S.] art.
76(2)(b) (Eng. & Wales); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/10, art. 69(7)(a).
46 See Noor Mohammed v. The King, [1949] A.C. 182 (P.C.) 192 (appeal taken
from Brit. Guiana); Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1952] A.C. 694 (H.L.)
707 (appeal taken from Wales).
47 DAMA KA, supra note 33, at 121-23.
48 SPENCER, supra note 44, at 9-13.
49 CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. premier (Fr.).
50 See BOULOC, supra note 1, at 96.
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systems. They all respect the defendant's right to silence, which
clearly limits the court's ability to obtain a full picture of the
relevant facts." Germany, moreover, recognizes professional and
personal testimonial privileges to a much larger extent than most
common law jurisdictions. 52 Nor is the concept of excluding
illegally obtained evidence unknown in civil law systems.
French law, for example, regards certain procedural acts as "null"
when formal requirements have not been observed, and
accordingly refrains from admitting evidence acquired through
such acts.54 German law explicitly provides for the inadmissibility
of suspects' and witnesses' statements whenever certain illegal
means (force, threats, fraud, illicit promises) were used during the
person's interrogation." Beyond this and a few other instances of
51 Interestingly, the English system allows impeachment of the credibility of an
exonerating statement made by a defendant by raising the point that it was made "too
late." See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34 (Eng.). Under
German law, however, the timing of the defendant's statement cannot be used to
question its credibility. See 20 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN
STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 281 (282-84) [FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS] Oct. 26, 1965
(Ger.); 38 BGHST 302 (305) (Ger.). For a discussion of the rationale of the right to
remain silent, see John Jackson, Re-Conceptualizing the Right of Silence as an Effective
Fair Trial Standard, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 835, 841-54 (2009). For a discussion of
whether the procedural rules of the inquisitorial system put greater pressure on the
defendant to testify in court, see Damaika, supra note 17, at 527-29; Spencer, supra
note 17, at 23-24.
52 See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] Apr. 7,
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGT] 6, as amended, §§ 52 (Right to Refuse Testimony on
Personal Grounds), 53 (Right to Refuse Testimony on Professional Grounds), and 55
(Privilege against Self-Incrimination) (Ger.).
53 See Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 375, 375-
76 (2001) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not limited to use in the United States,
but is also found in other countries such as France or Germany).
54 See CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 171 (Fr.). For an overview of
various forms of nullites, see BOULOC, supra note 1, at 776-77.
55 See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] Apr. 7,
1987, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGT] 6, as amended, § 136a (Ger.), translated in Matthias
Mittag, A Legal Theoretical Approach to Criminal Procedure Law: The Structure of
Rules in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 7 GER. L.J. 637, 634 (2006):
(1) The accused's freedom to make up his mind and to manifest his will shall
not be impaired by ill-treatment, induced fatigue, physical interference,
administration of drugs, torment, deception or hypnosis. Coercion may be used
only as far as this is permitted by criminal procedure law. Threatening the
accused with measures not permitted under its provisions or holding out the
prospect of an advantage not envisaged by statute shall be prohibited.
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exclusion of evidence based on statute, German courts still regard
evidence as admissible, on principle, even if a procedural fault
occurred when the piece of evidence was obtained.56 However,
there is a growing tendency toward rejecting evidence that was
acquired in clear, conscious violation of a person's constitutional
rights.57 In that case, sanctioning the violation of basic rights is
seen as more important than the presentation of the "whole truth"
at the trial.
III. Convergence of the Opposing Models?
A. Hybrid Systems
The landscape of international procedural systems has shifted
from a stark division between codified and common law, to what
looks more like a checkerboard of individual approaches and
solutions. Each country's rules of criminal procedure do not
depend so much on its "legal culture,"" its national heritage, or its
adherence to one great scheme ("inquisitorial" or "adversarial").
Rather, they have been shaped by political and pragmatic
preferences that can change over time and are subject to transfers
(2) Measures which impair the accused's memory or his ability to understand
shall not be permitted.
(3) The prohibition under subsections (1) and (2) shall apply irrespective of the
accused's consent. Statements which were obtained in breach of this
prohibition shall not be used, even if the accused agrees to their use.
Id. By contrast the Police and Criminal Evidence Act , leaves it to the judge's discretion
to accept or reject illegally obtained evidence. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984,
c. 60, § 78 (U.K.).
56 German courts hold illegally obtained evidence to be inadmissible only if a
statute demands this result or if higher-ranking reasons exist to exclude the evidence.
See Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of Oct. 15, 2009, 2010 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 287; 44 BGHST 243 (249) (Ger.); 51 BGHST 285 (290) (Ger.).
57 See Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of March 16, 2006, 2006 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2684 (holding that evidence obtained through an arbitrary
warrantless search was inadmissible); Judgment of 18 April 2007, 2007 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2269. See also Judgment of the State Court of Appeals of
Oldenburg of 12 Oct. 2009 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3591 (holding that a
blood sample taken without judicial warrant was inadmissible).
58 See Tatjana Htrnle, Unterschiede zwischen Strafverfahrensordnungen und ihre
kulturellen Hintergriinde, 117 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GEsAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENCHAFT 801, passim (2005) (discussing cultural backgrounds of
various criminal procedure systems).
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and transplants.5 9
It is indeed becoming more and more difficult to place some of
today's legal systems in the inquisitorial or adversarial box.
During the last few decades, a number of "mixed" legal systems
have developed which are faithful to their inquisitorial origins in
some respects, but also display distinct adversarial features. o
Italy," Japan,6 2 and Spain 6"-although differing from each other in
many respects-are examples of this type of procedural
arrangement. Typically, in these hybrid systems there exists a
unilateral pretrial process, often conducted by the police under the
guidance of the public prosecutor.' The parties present evidence
at the trial, but the court retains a residual right (and obligation) to
ensure the relevant issues are covered at the trial. 65 Hybrid
59 Mdximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization ofPlea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Processes,
45 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 4-7 (2004). See also John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human
Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence, or
Realignment?, 68 MOD. L. REv. 737, 738-40 (2005) (legal transplants sometimes do not
have the intended effects, citing Italy as an example); Mirjan Damaika, The Uncertain
Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 839, 849 (1997) ("The music of the law changes, so to speak, when the
musical instruments and the players are no longer the same.").
60 See CHRISTINE SCHUON, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CLASH OF
LEGAL CULTURES 271-308 (2010).
61 See CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE[C.C.P.K[C. CRIM. PRO.] 1988, arts. 496, 498,
507 (It.) (describing the Italian system in which parties question witnesses first, then
judges ask additional questions and call additional witnesses if necessary). See, e.g.,
Ennio Amodio, Das Modell des Anklageprozesses im neuen italienischen
Strafverfahrensgesetzbuch, 102 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 171 passim (1990) (discussing goals and consequences of
procedural reform in Italy); Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and
Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, passim (2000); Alfonso M. Stile, Die Reform des
Strafverfahrens in Italien, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECH4TSWISSENCHAFT 429, passim (1992). See also TOMMASO RAFARCI, LA
PROVA CONTRARIA (2004) for a general discussion of Italian evidence law.
62 See KEiJI SOSHOHO [KEISOHO][C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 131 (Japan) containing
strong adversarial elements but allowing the presiding judge, at his discretion, to
interrogate witnesses first. See also id. art. 298 §2.
63 See L.E. CRIM. (Spain) arts. 728, 729 §2 (requiring parties to present evidence;
subsequently, judges can ask additional questions and also call witnesses proprio motu);
Vincente Gimeno Sendra, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 671 et seq. (2d ed. 2007).
64 See C.C.P. (It.) arts. 496, 498, 507.
65 See L.E. CRIM. (Spain), arts. 728, 729 §2.
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systems combine an active "truth-finding" role of state
representatives who initiate the process and determine its scope,
with an adversarial mode of presenting evidence.
This new breed of hybrid processes also exists in international
criminal courts, which seek to integrate party activity and judicial
responsibility.6 6 The formulation of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), which started operations in 1993, was largely
influenced by the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, and thus largely
reflects Anglo-American adversarial procedure. 67 Yet various
provisions exist that do not comport with adversarial orthodoxy.
For example, Rule 90(F) of ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence authorizes the trial chamber to "exercise control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to (i) make the interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of the truth; and (ii) avoid needless consumption
of time."68 Although control of the trial process is an essential
feature of judicial authority in all procedural systems, it is
interesting to see that Rule 90(F) specifically emphasizes the
"ascertainment of the truth" to be the goal of the trial process.69
The thorny issue of excluding illegally obtained evidence is
handled with delicacy in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence; the weighing process required under Rule 9570 hardly
resembles the straightforward approach prevalent in the United
States. Most significantly, Rule 98 permits the trial chamber to
order either party to produce additional evidence and to proprio
motu summon witnesses and order their attendance-an
opportunity for judicial activism that one would not expect to find
in rules mainly designed by Anglo-American lawyers. The
influence of Continental legal thinking is even more pronounced
66 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. R. 65 (2009)
[hereinafter ICTY].
67 Compare ICTY, U.N. Doc. §3 (2009) with FED. R. EVID. (2010-2011).
68 ICTY, U.N. Doc. R. 90 (2009).
69 Id
70 ICTY, U.N. Doc. R. 95 (2009) ("No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by
methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical
to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.").
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in the procedural rules of the International Criminal Court (ICC),"
which are the result of deliberations of a large number of national
representatives from all parts of the world. The ICC Statute
contains elements of both the adversarial and the inquisitorial
mode.72 It is generally the parties' prerogative to present evidence
in their favor, but according to Article 64(6)(d) of the Court's
Statute the Trial Chamber may, as necessary, "order the
production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to
the trial or presented during the trial by the parties." Further, Rule
140(2)(c) of the Court's Rules of Procedure and Evidence affords
the Trial Chamber the right to question a witness before or after a
witness is questioned by a participant.73
The provisions to be found in the ICTY and ICC Statutes are
typical of the new breed of "softly" adversarial systems: the judge
generally remains aloof from the presentation of evidence, but he
has a subsidiary right to ask questions and even to call evidence
sua sponte. The procedural concept behind such rules seems to
allocate a share of the responsibility for the trial outcome to the
judge as an active participant in the search for truth.74
B. Inquisitorial Process on the Retreat?
When we take a closer look at the movement of the tectonic
plates that has produced subtle and sometimes dramatic changes in
the universal distribution of procedural models, we can detect a
pattern. Leaving international tribunals with their necessary
compromise solutions apart, there exists a clear trend toward an
expansion of adversarial elements at the expense of "pure"
inquisitorial systems. Several countries of the Continental
tradition have opened up to adversariness and have embraced
active party involvement at the trial stage, whereas no similar
inroads of inquisitorial ideas in the common law world have been
71 See International Criminal Court R. P. and Evid. (2002).
72 See SCHUON, supra note 60, at 271-308. See also CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING,
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 219-20 (2001).
73 See Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International
Criminal Proceedings, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 1439, 1475 et seq. (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
74 See Damagka, supra note 17, at 527-29.
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documented.15  One might be led to assume that this switchover
movement finally proves the inherent superiority of the adversarial
system, but there may well be alternative explanations available.
One important factor in the advance of adversarial elements is
the influence of international human rights instruments, most
importantly the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and, in Europe, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR).76 These instruments contain specific provisions on the
rights of criminal suspects and defendants,77 and they have been
shaped by Anglo-American legal thinking. Although the human
rights instruments do not prescribe a certain trial mode, they
emphasize the right to conduct an active defense" and provide for
the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. 9 In Europe,
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourgo has encouraged (or even pushed) the states' parties to
75 See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
76 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/art. 14 (March 24, 1976); Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, June 1, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R. The ICCPR was
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations in 1966, and entered into force in
1976. The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/ch. VI (March 24,
1976). The ECHR was concluded, under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1950,
and entered into force in 1953. Currently, forty-seven states in Europe and beyond have
become members states of the European Convention.
77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/art. 14 (March 24, 1976); Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, June 1, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R. These articles are
not identical but very similar in substance.
78 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/art. 14(3)(b),(d) (March 24, 1976); Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(3)(b)-(c), June 1, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(sufficient time to prepare defense, right to be present at trial, right to choose or to have
assigned a defense lawyer).
79 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/art. 14(3) (March 24, 1976) ("In the determination of any
criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality . . . [t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him.").
80 Anyone who feels aggrieved in his or her rights under the ECHR by an act of
one of the Member States can, after exhausting the appropriate domestic remedies, apply
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the ECHR toward adapting their procedural arrangements to the
demands of the Convention. The Court's emphasis on (among
others) the defendant's confrontation right" may well have had an
influence on the overall thinking about the structure of the trial in
Europe.
Other considerations may have further contributed to the
attractiveness of the adversary model. There is, first, the persistent
rumor that the suspect in the inquisitorial process is regarded as a
mere object of the inquisition and subject to oppressive methods in
search of confessions, rather than a party with rights of its own.
Although this notion has little to do with modem procedures of the
inquisitorial system it evokes the image of hooded minions of the
Spanish Inquisition. 82 By contrast, the adversarial system is
associated with individual autonomy and equality of arms between
the prosecution and the defense. The premise of the adversarial
system, that the defendant enters the courtroom on equal footing
with the prosecutor, evokes democratic and egalitarian ideals."
This image persists even though, in reality, defendants lacking
adequate means for mounting a full defense often feel constrained
for relief to the European Court of Human Rights; Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 34-35, June 1, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R. The
Court can declare that the petitioner's rights under the ECHR have been violated and can
oblige the state in question to pay the petitioner financial damages. Id. art. 41.
81 See, e.g., Unterpertinger v. Austria (No. 9120/80), Eur. Ct. H.R. 28-30 (1986);
Doorson v. Netherlands (No. 20524/92), Eur. Ct. H.R. 66-80 (1996); Van Mechelen v.
Netherlands (No. 21363/93), Eur. Ct. HR. 1 46-65 (1997); Romanov v. Russia (No.
41461/02), Eur. Ct. H.R. 97-106 (2008).
82 See, e.g., McEwan supra note 12, at 59 ("Defendants in continental trials are at
the mercy of the presiding judge, lacking the protective shield of the Anglo-American
exclusionary rules about bad character."); Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and
Jury Systems: More Likely To Do Justice, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 177 (2003)
("In the adversarial system, the lawyer for a party has the duty to act zealously and
faithfully for his client .... That is simply not the obligation of an inquisitorial judge.").
See also CRAIG M. BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY XXi-xxii
(Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2007).
83 In some countries, the fact alone that the adversarial system is practiced in the
United States may make it more attractive than one's own procedural arrangements
associated with authoritarian political regimes of the past. See Grande, supra note 61, at
231 ("Being associated with Lockean liberal values, distrust of the state, restraint of state
power, and freedom from the state's intrusion in private lives, adversary criminal
procedure symbolizes the procedural model that would appear to best safeguard the
individual against state abuses."). See also Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1989).
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to accept a deal involving a guilty plea.
Proponents of the adversarial system further argue that this
system is more likely than its inquisitorial competitor to bring out
the "truth." They claim that the self-interests of the prosecutor, as
well as the defendant, will move each party to do everything in its
power to collect and present evidence in its favor, whereas the
inquisitorial system must rely on the judges' self-motivation to
bring their professional expertise to each case.8 4 However, that
image of a competitive hunt for "truth" is rebutted, to some extent,
by the reality of the courtroom. For one, the defendant's ability to
effectively present his version of the truth critically depends on his
financial ability to hire a knowledgeable and astute lawyer
interested in his case, a condition likely to be absent in practice."
By contrast, the quality of legal representation, though not
inconsequential, is not as crucial to the inquisitorial process
because the judge is professionally trained to examine both sides
of the case.86 Secondly, the parties' self-interest in the adversarial
mode is likely to present the trier of fact with a carefully selected,
biased set of facts." Two half-truths don't necessarily add up to
one truth, especially when the parties do not have equal access to
the means necessary for effectively presenting evidence in court."
The adversarial system's reliance on the power of cross-
examination may likewise be overstated.8 9 It cannot be doubted
that the confrontation of witnesses with thorough questioning by a
party critical of these witnesses' accounts can reveal inaccuracies
and lies, but a professionally conducted cross-examination may
also confuse or disturb truthful witnesses and shatter their
credibility in the eyes of the trier of fact.9 0 On balance, the
84 See Damaika, supra note 17, at 563; Trtig & Kerner, supra note 32, at 192.
85 See Walpin, supra note 82, at 180.
86 See BRADLEY, supra note 82, at xviii-xix; Grande, supra note 61, at 161-62;
Hrmle, supra note 58, at 833.
87 See John D. Jackson, Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal
Tribunals, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 17, 24-25 (2009).
88 Cf Albin Eser, Reflexionen zum Prozesssystem und Verfahrensrecht
internationaler Strafgerichtsbarkeit, in STRAFRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT.
FESTSCHRIFT FOR KLAUS TIEDEMANN 1453, 1459-60 (Ulrich Sieber et al. eds., 2008).
89 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 410 (2d ed. 2008).
90 See Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 44, at 215-217; Spencer, supra note 44,
at 629. One further drawback of the adversarial mode is that it tends to consume
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adversarial system appears not a priori to be in a better position
than its competitor to bring out the "truth," unless one adheres
strictly to a consensus theory of truth.
What emerges is a non liquet situation. Neither the adversarial
nor the inquisitorial mode can guarantee a fair trial outcome based
upon the "truth." On the other hand, it is possible, under favorable
conditions, to arrive at a reliable factual basis through adversarial
as well as inquisitorial proceedings. In such a situation, the trend
toward hybrid procedural systems may reflect the work of an
invisible hand guiding the criminal process toward optimal
conditions. The convergence of the extremes toward a cooperative
model, where the parties and the court work together in an effort
to determine the "true" facts, may follow an inner logic.9 Yet, a
system built on cooperation needs to function even when one of
the parties refuses to cooperate. The defense must retain the
option of abstaining or withdrawing from the cooperative effort,
and the system must not turn the defendant's refusal to play along
against him by inferring guilt from his lack of cooperation in the
common search for the truth.92
C. Contours ofa "Compromise" Model
This is not the occasion to draw a comprehensive picture of a
cooperative procedural model that might be conducive to finding
the "truth" as the basis for the judgment. I limit myself to
suggesting a few general considerations that might be helpful to an
effort to construe such a model.
The first principle I propose concerns the question of who
should be responsible for finding the truth. Regardless of the
mode of trial, the burden of providing the basis for the criminal
judgment should be carried by those who wish to convict the
defendant.93 In modern systems of criminal procedure, it is almost
significantly more trial time because every witness is examined by two parties who often
go over the same issues; moreover, bench conferences deciding difficult procedural
issues prompted by complicated rules of evidence also draw out adversarial trials. See
CASSESE, supra note 89, at 365.
91 See Hdmle, supra note 58, at 829; Francoise Tulkens, Negotiated Justice, in
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra note 17, at 677.
92 See Tulkens, supra note 17, at 675-76.
93 Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 44, at 348.
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invariably9 4 the state that brings suit against a private party. It is
therefore the agents of the state that carry the burden of proof.
They must present to the trier of fact a sufficient basis for
convicting the defendant. 95
The state agent in charge of collecting, preserving, and
presenting the incriminating facts can be a prosecutor or a judge,
and these individuals can also share these tasks.96 The person(s) in
charge of collecting and presenting evidence should, to the extent
possible, be free from political influence. No member of the
executive should have the authority to overrule, on political,
financial or personal considerations, the prosecutor's professional
decision on the filing or withholding of charges." In order to
provide double control, the person(s) responsible for collecting
and presenting evidence and the judge(s) who hear(s) the case and
ultimately render judgment should be independent of each other.
Thus, the defendant would be convicted only if each state agent
independently concludes that he or she is guilty. If this double
finding of guilt has been made, there is a high probability that the
defendant is "truly" guilty and that the state has met its
responsibility to present sufficient incriminating evidence. If the
criminal process is organized in the manner described above, the
question of who is responsible for presenting the evidence at the
trial is of secondary importance. 98 One strong argument against
94 Remaining instances of criminal prosecution by the private victim can be
neglected here.
95 A "sufficient" basis is in the common law world defined as proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. In terms of the correspondence theory of truth, a sufficient basis is a
plausible version of reality that can be accepted as "true."
96 Some Continental systems, such as France, Spain and the Netherlands, have
retained the investigating magistrate. See C. PR. PEN. 49-52.1, 79-230 (2010) (Fr.); Sv
181-241c (2010) (Neth.); L.E. CRiM. 299-325 (2010) (Spain). Judicial pre-trial
investigations have become subject to controversy and are on the brink of abolition in
France. See BOULOC, supra note 1, at 459. The usefulness of a judicial investigation is
limited without sufficient staff and means to conduct an independent investigation;
however an investigative magistrate could be of use as a neutral agent accepting
evidence by request of the defense. Cf C. PR. PEN. 82-1 (2010) (Fr.).
97 Many Continental legal systems cast the public prosecutor in a neutral role. See,
e.g., StPO §160 (2) (2010) (F.R.G.). This statutory exhortation to act like a judge is not
effective unless supported by rules that make the prosecutor independent from political
influence.
98 See Eser, supra note 88, at 1470.
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placing the responsibility for presenting evidence and
interrogating witnesses on the trial judge-as the inquisitorial
system typically does-is the fact that a judge who is to conduct
the presentation of evidence needs to have sufficient prior
information on the facts of the case, which can subsequently
compromise his objectivity and impartiality.99
What, then, is the role of the defense, in the effort of finding
the "truth"? The defense has no obligation to participate in the
truth-finding process, and its passivity must not lead to any
repercussions against the defendant, either in the evaluation of the
evidence or in sentencing."oo The defense must, on the other hand,
have the option of taking an active part in the collection and
presentation of evidence.
This applies not only to the trial, but it also is of crucial
importance that the defense is involved in the effort to find the
"truth" from the early stages of the criminal investigation.10' The
reason for this proposal is simple: Regardless of the choice of an
adversarial or an inquisitorial trial structure, most criminal cases
are no longer decided on the basis of a traditional "full" trial.10 2 In
common law as well as in civil law systems, the great majority of
cases are resolved without trial, either through a prosecutorial
decision not to bring charges, which can be coupled with an
informal sanction imposed on the suspect, or through a plea of
guilty or its equivalent. 0 3 Whenever the state imposes sanctions,
99 On the strong influence of prior information on the judgment, see Bernd
Schinemann, Der Richter im Strafverfahren als manipulierter Dritter? Zur empirischen
Bestatigung von Perseveranz- und Schulterschlusseffekt, 2000 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 159
(2000).
100 See supra text accompanying note 121.
101 See Heike Jung, Nothing But the Truth? Some Facts, Impressions and
Confessions about Truth in Criminal Procedure, in I THE TRIAL ON TRIAL 147, 154
(Antony Duff et al. eds., 2004).
102 See id. at 155.
103 See Thomas Weigend, The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal: Plea Bargaining
Invades German Criminal Procedure, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN
DAMAKA 39, 41 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008). Since 2009, Section 257(c) of the
German Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a case resolution by way of an
"understanding," consisting of the court's indication of a (lenient) sentence in exchange
for the defendant's confession or a similar procedural move. Similar procedures are
available in France and Italy. See CODE DE PROCtDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. 495-7
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even informal ones, on the suspect as a reaction to an offense he
has allegedly committed, the fact that no trial has taken place does
not save the state the need to legitimize the sanction by a finding
of "true" facts. 10 4 When the sanction is negotiated between the
prosecutor (or judge) and the defense it is especially important that
there is a factual basis on which both sides can rely in the
bargaining process."os Otherwise, the outcome of the bargaining
process depends not on considerations of fairness and justice, but
solely on the (perceived) distribution of power between the parties,
or on their relative skills at gambling.'0 6
Although truth-finding before or in the absence of a trial is of
great importance, procedural systems often do not provide for
appropriate fact-finding mechanisms at the investigation stage.10 7
Especially in common law systems, there exist no rules guiding
the collection of evidence or the interaction between parties before
trial. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the defense, in
the early stages of the criminal process, is often non-existent or not
yet sufficiently organized to counter the vastly superior manpower
and means of the prosecution. 108 Procedural systems must,
therefore, be adapted to the need for early defense involvement.109
Defense lawyers must be given the legal as well as the material
means to conduct their own investigation, and they must receive
sufficient information about the case and the evidence well ahead
- 495-16 (Fr.); C.c.P. arts. 444-48. (It.).
104 See Weigend, supra note 103, at 60 (arguing that "practical compromise" is
insufficient to legitimize a criminal conviction; rather, legitimacy can be obtained only
through an honest attempt "to bring out the truth").
105 See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 560
(2006) (describing the disparate power between the prosecutor and the defense
throughout the plea process).
106 Cf Weigend, supra note 103, at 59 (asserting that the "bargained-for sentence"
often fails to adequately reflect defendant's guilt or culpability, and thus the outcome
rarely fulfills the "requirements of criminal "justice").
107 See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 105 passim (explaining the wide variations in
discovery statutes or rules of criminal procedure, which often limit the breadth of
evidence to which the defense has access).
108 Id. at 602.
109 Cf id at 595 ("[W]e should devise rules that reflect the presumption of
innocence. . . . To this end, we should start with the presumption that all relevant
evidence known to the police and prosecution should be discoverable [by the defense]
and therefore subject to scrutiny and potential challenge.").
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of the trial date."o One can think of various models to make an
active and well-informed defense practically feasible. The
common law, in the name of "equality of arms," leaves the
defense to their own devices and in some systems still provides
only minimal discovery."' This is not necessarily the best and
fairest option. The defense is hardly in a position to conduct an
effective investigation, given its lack of power to compel
cooperation from witnesses and experts as well as its typical lack
of financial means." 2 Full disclosure of the prosecution file before
trial, as practiced in Germany,' creates occasional problems, such
as concern over the protection of sensitive witnesses and
documents.1" However, protective rules can be established to
provide a viable compromise between the interests of the police
and prosecutor to keep the investigation secret and the interest of
the defense lawyer to obtain enough information for preparing an
110 See id. at 598-600 (proposing that discovery rules should allow for early defense
access, and also that discovery should be completed before a trial date is even set).
Ill For a discussion of the importance of full discovery, see id. at 557 ("[lIn 95% of
criminal cases, evidence is not evaluated by a jury, witnesses are not subjected to cross-
examination, and the prosecution is not put to its proof. Because the evidence available
at the time of many pleas is the evidence that the prosecution has chosen to disclose,
prosecutors end up being the fact-finders, rather than juries.").
112 See id. at 578 (acknowledging that in many states, the defense cannot compel the
prosecution to disclose its witnesses and their statements prior to trial).
113 The German Code of Criminal Procedure provides a general right for defense
counsel "to inspect the file that has been presented to the court or would have to be
presented to the court in case charges are filed." STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], April 7, 1987, BUNDESGESETZBLATE I [BGBL] 1074, as
amended, § 147, 1 (Ger.) [hereinafter STPO]. This refers to the case file of the
prosecutor, who is obliged to turn the file of the investigation over to the trial court when
he has filed charges. The defense inspection right applies, in principle, at all times
during the investigation. Id. 3. However, the prosecutor can (and often does) deny
defense inspection as long as the investigation continues (i.e., as long as charges have
not been filed) if inspection might "jeopardize the purpose of the investigation." Id. 1 2.
Since the defense lawyer can pass on to his client any information gleaned from the file,
denial can be based on the fear that the defendant might abuse such information, for
example to intimidate or otherwise improperly influence witnesses.
114 According to Section 68, paragraph 4 of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure, information concerning the name and address of a witness can be removed
from the file if there exists a risk that the witness could be intimidated or harmed. The
government can also deny access to documents if their disclosure could jeopardize the
well-being of the state. See STPO § 96 (1987) (Ger.).
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effective defense."' Defense access to crucial information on the
case can be combined with a right of the defense lawyer to be
present at, or even participate in, certain important instances of
evidence-gathering before trial, for example, interrogations
conducted by a magistrate. A defense lawyer's right to demand
such interrogations16 -whose results could be used as trial
evidence-would further promote a true "equality of arms" during
the pre-trial phase.
The question of the involvement of jurors or other lay judges,
however relevant as an element of democratic openness of the
criminal process, is of little consequence in the search for the
truth."' Juries, though more common in the Anglo-American
world, also exist in several legal systems that still adhere to their
inquisitorial heritage, such as Austria"' and Belgium.1' On the
other hand, U.S. judges can try cases without a jury, 20 which may
make the process a little less formal, but does not change the
structure of the presentation of evidence. From the perspective of
truth-finding, jurors deciding alone may be a less desirable feature
of the process because it is important that the rationality of the
determination of guilt is supported by written reasons and can be
subject to meaningful review.' 2 ' Since jurors cannot be expected
to submit elaborate reasons for their findings, it may be preferable
to integrate the lay element with professional judges to form a
115 Cf Prosser, supra note 105, at 611-12 (discussing provisions for protective
orders and limitations during depositions, which embody this compromise).
116 In Italy, defense lawyers can even conduct searches themselves; they only need
the owner's consent if the search involves a home. See C.c.p. art. 38 (It.).
117 Cf John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 477, 477-
82 (2002) (describing the possibility for mistake with juries, coupled with the jury's lack
of accountability to the legal system); see also Prosser, supra note 105, at 547 (noting
the "scores of exoneration[s]" based on actual innocence, which has "taught us that juries
sometimes convict [the] innocent .... ).
118 See Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, STPO), at §§ 31
(2), 32.
119 See 1994 CONST. art. 150 (Belg.).
120 See, e.g., FED. R. CluM. P. 23(a).
121 On the requirement of a reasoned judgment under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, see Janatuinen v. Finland, judgment of 8 December 2009,
App. No. 28552/05, 1 64; Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, judgment of 21 January 1999, App. No.
30544/96, T 26 with further references.
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mixed bench.'22
In summary, a "compromise" model that combines the features
that may be best suited for a determination of the truth could
consist of:
* a thorough pretrial investigation guided by a
state agent (judge or prosecutor) but with an
option for the defense to participate and to
obtain access to the results of the investigation;
and
* a trial before a court that consists at least partly
of professional judges, where the evidence is
initially presented by the prosecution and the
defense, but where the judges can question
witnesses and introduce additional evidence on
their own motion. 12 3
IV. Conclusion
Inquisitorial and adversarial models of trying criminal cases do
not differ so much in their aim-the finding of the "truth"-but in
the allocation of responsibility for reaching it.'24 While it remains
an open question as to which mode is, in general, better suited to
reach the goal of truth-finding, there are strong indications for a
convergence of the two models toward shared responsibility, with
judges becoming more active in adversarial systems and parties
obtaining greater participation rights in inquisitorial systems. 125
The trend of the future may be the recognition of responsibility for
truth-finding as a task to be shared by the prosecution and the
court, with the defense free to join or to remain passive, relying on
the presumption of innocence.126 If that holds true, the question of
"adversarial" or "inquisitorial" presentation of evidence loses
much of its theoretical significance and becomes an issue of mere
trial technique.
122 See Spencer, supra note 44, at 622 (stating that requiring judges to provide a
reasoned decision acts as a reasonable safeguard against negligence and arbitrariness).
For a discussion of the difficulties of holding juries accountable, see Jackson, supra note
117, at 517-24.
123 See supra Part III(C).
124 See supra Part II.
125 See supra Part III(A).
126 See supra Part III(B).
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Meanwhile, there exists a risk that truth-finding at trial,
irrespective of the mode of presenting evidence, becomes
marginalized by a universal advance of case resolutions without
trial, including the imposition of severe criminal sanctions in
summary proceedings.127 This development raises the important
issue as to what safeguards can be devised to make sure that
sanctions without trial are based on an honest search for the truth,
and not on the power differential between the state and the
accused.' 28 It is in this arena that the procedural battles of the
twenty-first century will have to be fought.
127 See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 107-120 and accompanying text.
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